Review by the National Security Adviser (UK): Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre. December 2013. 5 pages.
Saturday, December 21, 2013
Wednesday, December 11, 2013
Billet - 01Business - De l’impact de pratiques de cyber-surveillance sur les relations internationales
Billet - 01Business - De l’impact de pratiques de cyber-surveillance sur les relations internationales. Daniel Ventre. 10 décembre 2013
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
Publications de la Chaire Cybersécurité et Cyberdéfense
Retrouvez les publications de la Chaire Cybersécurité et Cyberdéfense sur le site du CREC-Saint-Cyr.
Monday, September 2, 2013
News - Napolitano urges successor to prepare for cyber attack
"Napolitano urges successor to prepare for cyber attack". Federal Time, August 27, 2013. "Our country will, at some point, face a major cyber event that will have a serious effect on our lives, our economy, and the everyday functioning of our society".
News - U.S. spy agencies mounted 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011
"U.S. spy agencies mounted 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011". The Washington Post. August 31, 2013
"Black Budget" of spy agencies" - The Washington Post.
"Of the 231 offensive operations conducted in 2011, the budget said, nearly three-quarters were against top-priority targets, which former officials say includes adversaries such as Iran, Russia, China and North Korea and activities such as nuclear proliferation".
Monday, August 26, 2013
Article - The Cost of Anonymizing a Cybercriminal's Internet Activities - Dancho Danchev
Dancho Danchev proposes an interesting series of 4 articles about "The Cost of Anonymizing a Cybercriminal's Internet Activities" - Dancho Danchev's Blog - August 23, 2013
News - The FBI claims to have neutralized Anonymous
The FBI claims to have neutralized Anonymous - August 26th, 2013 - Security Affairs
Friday, August 23, 2013
Report - The Fog of Cyber Defense - NDU Helsinki
"The Fog of Cyber Defence" - Eds. Jari Rantapelkonen & Mirva Salminen - National Defence University Helsinki - Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy - 2013 - 236 pages
This book is structured around 3 chapters: Cyberspace, Cybersecurity, Cyber War. The book focuses on Nordic cooperation in the field of defence policy on a political level. Plenty of questions will rise on this research area, such as “Who are the enemies?”; “What are the rules of engagement?”; “Shall we be defensive or offensive in Cyber?”; and “How do we define ‘credible defence’ in cyber?”.
Article - Asia: the cybersecurity battleground - CSIS
"Asia: the cybersecurity battleground" - James A. Lewis - CSIS - July 23, 2013
Thursday, August 22, 2013
Article - Don't Buy the Cyberhype - by Martin C. Libicki
Don't Buy the Cyberhype - by Martin C. Libicki. (RAND Corporation). ForeignAffairs.com, August 16, 2013.
Although there is a real risk of a massive cyberattack, the perception of that risk is overblown. In fact, the greatest danger is that the United States will respond to a cyberattack with a real one.
Wednesday, August 21, 2013
Article - Elina Noor - Plugging Cyber Warfare Governance: Asia Should Act Now
Article by Elina Noor (RSIS - Singapore): "Plugging Cyber Warfare Governance: Asia Should Act Now". 15 Augustr 2013.
Synopsis: While academics debate whether cyber warfare is even possible within the traditional notion of war, three realities need to be confronted. Thus far silent on the issue, Asia must now contribute to the evolution of laws to govern cyber warfare.
News - Russia is setting up cyber warfare unit
Russia has decided to increase its cyber defense capabilities: it will set up a cybersecurity command and a new branch of the armed forces.
Tuesday, August 20, 2013
Article - Eric Hazane - Pipelines et gazoducs potentiellement vulnérables à une cyberattaque indécelable
"Pipelines et gazoducs potentiellement vulnérables à une cyberattaque indécelable", Eric Hazane (membre de la chaire Cybersécurité & Cyberdéfense), 01Business, 14 août 2013.
Tuesday, July 23, 2013
Interview - France culture - Le cyber: un nouvel espace pour la guerre
Emission "Affaires Etrangères" sur France Culture: "Le cyber: un nouvel espace pour la guerre". Christine Ockrent. Avec Daniel Ventre (CNRS / Chaire cyberdéfense), Marc Hecker (IFRI), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation). Enregistrement de l'émission diffusée le 20 juillet 2013.
Article - Analyse du rapport Mandiant
Daniel Ventre, Une analyse du rapport Mandiant, Sécurité Globale n°23 - "Cyber : la guerre a commencé", à paraître, Août 2013
Seminar - Defining Cyberconflict - RSIS Singapore
Daniel Ventre, "Defining cyberconflict", RSIS Seminar (Rajaratnam School of International Studies), Singapore, 18 July 2013.
Article - Iran et cyberdéfense - revue MISC
Daniel Ventre, "Iran: stratégies pour une utilisation politique du cyberespace", revue MISC n°68, Juillet/août 2013
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
Conference - Chine: Stratégies et Politiques de Cybersécurité et Cyberdéfense
La Chaire Cybersécurité et Cyberdéfense organise le 1° juillet 2013 une conférence internationale sur le thème : "Comprendre les stratégies et politiques de cybersécurité et cyberdéfense de la Chine".
Programme:
Lundi 1° juillet 2013
9h - 17h
Hotel National des Invalides.
Auditorium Austerlitz
129, rue de Grenelle
75007 Paris
Entrée gratuite. Inscription obligatoire: invitations@chaire-cyber.fr
Programme:
- Organisation, structure des réseaux mondiaux et place de la Chine. Prof. Kavé Salamatian, Université de Savoie
- China’s Internet Development and cybersecurity : policies and practices. Xu Longdi, Xu Longdi, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) (Chine).
- Internet, réseaux sociaux, et cyberespace: impacts à l’intérieur de la Chine / Social networks, internet,
cyberspace : impact on Chinese society and political stability. Alice Ekman (IFRI)
- Information Dominance : PLA Views of Information Warfare and Cyberwarfare. Dean Cheng, The Heritage Foundation, Asian Studies Center (États-Unis).
- China’s cyber strategy and its implications for Europe. Nicola Casarini, European Union Institute
for Security Studies (EUISS).
- Chine-Russie-Iran, une cybercommunauté de l’information. Thomas Flichy, Centre de recherche des écoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan (CREC Saint-Cyr)
- The China Factor in India’s cybersecurity posture. Cherian Samuel, Institute for Defense Sudies and Analyses (IDSA) (Inde).
- Singaporean Perspectives on China and IW, Alan Chong, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) (Singapour).
Sunday, June 9, 2013
News - USA and the Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (OCEO)
Abstract of the Presidential Policy Directive 20:
(OCEO) "can offer unique and unconventional capabilities to advance US national objectives around the world with little or no warning to the adversary or target and with potential effects ranging from subtle to severely damaging".
The government will "identify potential targets of national importance where OCEO can offer a favorable balance of effectiveness and risk as compared with other instruments of national power".
OCEO are "operations and related programs or activities … conducted by or on behalf of the United StatesGovernment, in or through cyberspace, that are intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside United States government networks."
Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, Obama orders US to draw up overseas target list for cyber-attacks, UK, The Guardian, Friday 7, June 2013.
Tuesday, May 28, 2013
Cyber-espionnage américain
Article: "Piratage d'Etat: et aux USA?", par Clara Leonard, ZDNet, 27 mai 2013. Où il est question de l'organisation du cyberespionnage de la NSA.
L'article fait également référence à un texte publié dans Business Week récemment: "How the US Government hacks the world" (Michael Riley, 23 mai 2013)
Nous retenons de ces deux articles:
- L'existence d'unité américaine spécifique de cyberespionnage (Nom de l'unité: Tailored Access Operations)
- Un espionnage massif et planétaire pratiqué par les USA
- Le briefing quotidien du renseignement, remis au président américain, serait composé à 75% au moins d'informations issues du cyberespionnage (c'était déjà le cas sous G.W. Bush)
- Michael Hayden, ancien patron de la NSA reconnait que les américains sont les meilleurs au monde pour ce type d'activité
- Afin de justifier leurs critiques à l'encontre de la Chine, les USA estiment qu'il y a des pratiques de cyberespionnage autorisées et d'autres non (!) "The U.S. position is that some kinds of hacking are more acceptable than others". Il y a donc un piratage, un espionnage moralement acceptable (celui pratiqué par les USA!) et celui qui ne l'est pas (pratiqué par la Chine...)
Les cibles jugeront par elles-mêmes de la pertinence de la distinction...
Wednesday, May 22, 2013
Call for papers - Journées C&ESAR 2013
C&ESAR Rennes 2013. 19-21 novembre 2013. Thème: Sécurité des Systèmes Numériques Industriels. Date limite pour la soumission des propositions: 24 juin 2013. Détails.
Colloque - Cyber-attaques: comment y faire face?
Cyber-attaques: comment y faire face? 6° Forum ISA-France. 26-27 juin 2013. Espace Hamelin, Paris. Inscriptions. Programme.
Colloque sur la cybersécurité - Rennes - 3 juin 2013
L'Ecole des Transmissions propose à Rennes, le 3 juin 2013, un colloque intitulé "La cybersécurité: un enjeu mondial, une priorité nationale, des réponses régionales". Programme et inscription.
Application - Visualiser les cyberattaques
Deutsche Telekom AG propose une nouvelle application en ligne permettant de visualiser les cyberattaques, en temps réel.
Colloque - Les frontières du cyberespace - Rennes - 4 juin 2013
Colloque - Les frontières du cyberespace - Rennes - 4 juin 2013
Le Pôle Action Globale et Forces Terrestres du CREC (Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan) organise, avec le soutien de la Chaire de Cyberdéfense et Cybersécurité (Saint-Cyr/Sogeti/Thales), une journée d'étude sur le thème "Les frontières du Cyberespace".
Tuesday, May 21, 2013
Report - Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities - M. Libicki
Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities - M. C. Libicki. RAND Corporation. May 2013. 32 pages.
"Brandishing a cyber capability would do three things: declare a capability, suggest the possibility of its use in a particular circumstance, and indicate that such use would really hurt [...] Advertising cyberwar capabilities may be helpful. It may back up a deterrence strategy. It might dissuade other states from conventional mischief or even from investing in mischiefmaking capabilities. [...] Yet proving such capability is not easy, even if it exists" (p.29)
Interview - M. Libicki - It's a Decision, Not a Conclusion
Interview - M. Libicki - It's a Decision, Not a Conclusion.
The New-York Times. February 28, 2013.
The New-York Times. February 28, 2013.
Article - M.C. Libicki - Managing September 12th in Cyberspace
M.C. Libicki - Managing September 12th in Cyberspace
Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs - Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats - United States House of Representatives
RAND Office of External Affairs. March 21, 2013.
Tuesday, May 14, 2013
Conférence - Les territoires réels et virtuels de l'insécurité
L'Université de Laval (Canada) organise, dans le cadre de l'Ecole d'été sur les terrorismes, une semaine de conférences sur le thème "Les territoires réels et virtuels de l'insécurité". Mon intervention, le 15 mai 2013, est intitulée "Définir le cyberconflit". La matinée sera poursuivie avec l'intervention de Richard Garon (Université de Laval), qui pose la question "Infoguerre ou guerre de l'information"?
Programme:
News - Stratégie canadienne de cybersécurité
Stratégie canadienne de cybersécurité : un bilan mitigé pour le gouvernement fédéral. Hugo Loiseau. Mai 2013. http://www.usherbrooke.ca/medias/communiques/communiques-details/c/21881/
News - La sécurité ne sera jamais garantie...
Voici un article qui ne traite pas de "cyber" mais qui donne à réfléchir quant à la distance qui nous sépare de la perfection en matière de sécurité. De récentes révélations nous informent en effet de l'existence de failles humaines et d'erreurs à répétition commises dans les processus de gestion de l'arsenal nucléaire américain. Les compétences et le niveau de sérieux requis pour ces missions semblent ne pas être totalement présents. L'info elle-même est-elle à prendre au pied de la lettre?
"L'arsenal nucléaire américain: une organisation de broche à foin? " http://fr-ca.actualites.yahoo.com/blogues/la-chronique-de-normand-lester/larsenal-nucleaire-americain-une-organisation-de-broche-a-foin-160516441.html
Monday, May 6, 2013
News - USA - DoD - Annual report to Congress -
Department of Defense. Annual report to Congress. Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013, 83 pages, May 2013. Download the report
Monday, February 25, 2013
An interview with Prof. Alan Chong (RSIS – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies - Singapore)
by Daniel Ventre (CNRS - CESDIP/GERN; Chair in Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity - Ecoles Militaires de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan / Sogeti / Thalès)
February 25, 2013
February 25, 2013
(This article may not be reproduced without the author’s permission)
Alan Chong is Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. He has published widely on the notion of soft power and the role of ideas in constructing the international relations of Singapore and Asia. His publications have appeared in The Pacific Review; International Relations of the Asia-Pacific; Asian Survey; East Asia: an International Quarterly; Politics, Religion and Ideology; the Review of International Studies; Alternatives: Global, Local, Political; and the Cambridge Review of International Affairs. He is also the author of Foreign Policy in Global Information Space: Actualizing Soft Power (Palgrave, 2007). He is currently working on several projects exploring the notion of ‘Asian international theory’. More information at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/grad/faculty-members.htm
Daniel Ventre: Although several definitions of “cyberspace” and “cyberwar” have been proposed (among militaries, governments, researchers…), there is no consensus on the definition of this object/concept. What is your own definition of “cyberspace” and “cyberwar”?
Alan Chong: Cyberspace refers to that communication space created between two or more connected digital sources. In political terms, it is a space parallel to terrestrial space. Unlike terrestrial space on earth, ‘asymmetries’ in cyberspace are less tangible and do not depend on the possession of natural resources, wide plains and rivers. What matters as strength in cyberspace is the possession and allocation of human talent. Cyberwar would logically refer to military-inspired attempts to disrupt, deny or destroy the electronic resources of the enemy through computer-based means with the aim of attaining military victory.
I would personally prefer the term ‘information operations’ to refer to that whole range of political interventions ranging from the theft of data, deception, disruption, to destruction enabled by electronic computer-based means. Information operations do not distinguish peacetime from wartime.
DV: According to you, what is the most appropriate approach to analyze/explain/understand cyberconflict (ie. its impact on international relations, the origins of cyberwars, etc.): a constructivist approach, a (neo) realist or neoliberal perspective?
AC: Definitely, a constructivist approach. The operational architecture of cyberspace requires the interaction between the ‘structure’ of electronic pathways and websites connected by multiple nodes, and numerous ‘agents’ in terms of terminals and operators. The design of malware and its corresponding ‘anti-virus’ software require agency-structure co-constitution of anticipated identities and lethalities.
On a conflict scenario level, waging cyberconflict requires the initiator to imagine the enemy’s pre-existing vulnerabilities and planned reactions. The initiator must employ this knowledge in order to retain plausible deniability when challenged in the open media.
DV: How might be described the main conceptual differences between the 1990s’ "information warfare" and today’s "cyberwar"?
AC: The notion of ‘information warfare’ is more accurate, comprehensive, and more flexible than cyberwar, since information warfare includes psychological operations and simple deception strategies. The latter two can also be operated through computerised means. In any case, I would prefer the phrase ‘information operations’ to encompass the widest possible range of strategic operations within, or associated with, computer usage.
DV: Efforts to conceptualize cyberconflict refer to ‘Cold war’ and ‘war on terror’ strategies, policies, concepts (cyber Cold War; cyber deterrence; invisible threat; insider threat; …). What is the most appropriate analogy to analyse cyberconflict: Cold war or War on terror?
AC: The War on Terror is more appropriate as a test case since it involves a whole array of non-state actors who act autonomously from sovereign states. Ideological considerations also factor in the cyber intentions of non-state actors. Using computer terminals, non-state actors can level the global playing field in relation to sovereign states. The Cold War was a largely sovereign state-to-state confrontation.
DV: How is the Singaporean approach of cybersecurity strategies differing from other nations?
AC: As far is it is revealed, the Singaporean cybersecurity approach is based on mostly civilian ‘whole of government/society’ principles. Secondly, the Singaporean approach is also based upon open information sharing at cyber conferences between civilian companies and government agencies. There is also a great deal of information learning between software firms at home and abroad.
DV: Your research expertise is focused on “soft power” concept. Could you please remind us the definition of this concept and its application in cybersecurity policies/strategies?
AC: Cybersecurity is connected to soft power in the sense that open information sharing on keeping the internet open, stable and dependable for global electronic commerce translates into a form of attracting a ‘noble’, ‘good practices’ community of experts and ordinary computer users into existence. This ‘good practice’ community is transnational and will hopefully transcend nationally-derived political obstacles.
Sunday, February 24, 2013
An interview with Dr. Martin C. Libicki (RAND Corporation) by Daniel Ventre
by Daniel Ventre (CNRS - CESDIP/GERN; Chair in Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity - Ecoles Militaires de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan / Sogeti / Thalès)
February 20, 2013
(Copyright 2013 Daniel Ventre . This article may not be reproduced without the author’s permission)
Daniel Ventre: Although several definitions of “cyberspace” and “cyberwar” have been proposed (among militaries, governments, researchers…), there is no consensus on the definition of this object/concept. What is your own definition of “cyberspace” and “cyberwar”?
Martin Libicki: Cyberwar should be the use of cyberwarfare (that is, techniques used to usurp the control of computers from their authorized users), in pursuit of politico-military aims (i.e., something that Clausewitz would recognize). Cyberspace is something that I define like this: it’s the Internet and everything connected to the Internet that is like the Internet. That’s more than a little fuzzy, to be sure. More to the point, I don’t believe there’s much point to defining cyberspace, in large part because it’s just a conduit to what is more interesting: the systems being hacked. The emphasis on cyberspace as such is like saying that traffic accidents happen in road-space, or that poison-pen campaigns happen in mail-space.
DV: If we agree that cyberspace is a new domain, what is a « frontier » / « borderline » in it ? Is it really necessary for nation-states to set up virtual frontiers? Is such a project feasible?
ML: The frontier of cyberspace is basically the first router that inbound traffic hits in the country (or the last router that outbound traffic hits); where the wires go is irrelevant. That formulation does not work if the Internet goes directly from an external source (satellite, RF transmissions) to end-consumers, but that’s a very small share of Internet traffic. States can apply border controls there (it’s feasible, China does it), but the first question in a democratic state is what a state gains by doing so (given that interference with the Internet is unpopular in some quarters and not costless).
DV: According to you, what is the most appropriate approach to analyze/explain/understand cyberconflict (ie. its impact on international relations, the origins of cyberwars, etc.): a constructivist approach, a (neo) realist or neoliberal perspective?
ML: This is probably as good a time as any to note that I was trained in economics, not international relations theory (and so I’m not so qualified to differentiate these terms). But maybe the place to start is with “cyberconflict,” whose meaning I’m unsure of. We really haven’t seen a true cyberwar. If cyberconflict means a difference of opinion among states, we have seen tussles about cyberspace in the latest ITU meeting in Dubai. The West told the ITU: hands off. The other big countries wanted the ITU to support a state’s right to manipulate its citizens’ access to the Internet. Was the West realist (Western media and the values it projects tend to be more popular with non-Western citizens than the reverse) or idealist (the West believes in its values and wants them propagated)? Hard to tell.
DV: What are the main conceptual differences between the 1990s’ "information warfare" and today’s "cyberwar"?
ML: Information warfare of the 1990s was a catch-all that included what we now call cyberwarfare but also psychological warfare, command-and-control warfare, and electronic warfare. It also could also include operational security (OPSEC) and military deception (MILDEP). The overall term evolved to “information operations” circa 1997, but that term is mostly used for psychological warfare and strategic communications today.
DV: Efforts to conceptualize cyberconflict refer to ‘Cold war’ and ‘war on terror’ strategies, policies, concepts (cyber Cold War; cyber deterrence; invisible threat; insider threat; …). What is the most appropriate analogy to analyse cyberconflict: Cold war or War on terror?
ML: Neither, really. The high-tech nature of cyber suggests the Cold War; the lone-wolf potential of cyber suggests the war on terrorism. But neither is a good fit, and, in both cases, for at least one common reason – cyberwar does not really inspire terror (as nuclear weapons do and terrorism aims to). So far cyberwar has been used for annoyance (Estonia, Georgia), as an aid to military operations (Operation Orchard), and for sabotage (Stuxnet). Note that nuclear weapons have been used for none of them; and terrorism is rarely used for sabotage, as such. I don’t think we have much choice but to consider cyberwar on its own merits (although some of the questions from the Cold War such as escalation, signalling, confidence-building measures etc. are potentially interesting to place in a cyber context).
News - Newsletter Défense-Sécurité & Parlement
Nouveau numéro de la newsletter "Défense-Sécurité & Parlement", février 2013, dédiée à la cyberdéfense. Dossier "Cyberdéfense: un enjeu mondial, une priorité nationale". Contributions de J.M. Bockel, E. Rihan Cipel, A. Coustilliere, J. Hebrard, J. Ferry, P. Pailloux, M. Quemener, Y. Jounot, O. Bohbot, J.M. Orozco, V. Maldonado, D. Ventre.
Wednesday, February 13, 2013
Report - Finland's Cyber Security Strategy 2013
Finland's Cyber Security Strategy 2013. Government Resolution 24.1.2013. 16 pages.
Reports - Australia's national security 2013
Report. First Australia's National Security report. January 2013. The document identifies the key national security risks and introduces cybersecurity issues:
• Espionage and foreign interference
• Instability in developing and fragile states
• Malicious cyber activity
• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
• Serious and organised crime
• State-based conflict or coercion significantly affecting Australia’s interests
• Terrorism and violent extremism
Reports - Cybersecurity Strategy of the E.U
Report. Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union. European Commission, 7.2.2013, 20 pages
Monday, February 11, 2013
News - Rapport de la NIE: la France (aussi) mènerait des cyberattaques contre les USA...
Un article d'Ellen Nakashima publié dans le Washington Post du 11 février 2013, revient sur un rapport de la NIE (National Intelligence Estimates) en date de quelques jours, lequel pointe une nouvelle fois du doigt les cyberopérations d'espionnage menées par la Chine massivement, mais également par d'autres acteurs comme la Russie, Israël... et la France.
Même si, comme le rapporte Ellen Nakashima, le volume d'opérations menées depuis ces 3 pays fait pâle figure par rapport à la Chine, mention de la France dans la liste des accusés peut être vue comme une forme de réponse du berger à la bergère. En effet, rappelons-nous qu'en novembre dernier, la presse française accusait les américains d'avoir piraté l'Elysée.
Wednesday, February 6, 2013
News - Crisis and Escalation in Cyberwar
New book from Martin Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberwar, RAND Corportation, 198 pages, 2012. Download : http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1215.pdf This book is based ont he results of a research funded by the 2011 RAND Project Air Force study on "US and Threat Non-Kinetic Capabilities".
"The basic message is simple: Crisis and escalation in cyberspace can be managed as long as policymakers understand the key differences between nonkinetic conflict in cyberspace and kinetic conflict in the physical world. Among these differences are the tremendous scope that cyberdefense affords; the near impossibility and thus the pointlessness of trying to disarm an adversary’s ability to carry out cyberwar; and the great ambiguity associated with cyberoperations—notably, the broad disjunction between the attacker’s intent, the actual effect, and the target’s perception of what happened. Thus, strategies should concentrate on (1) recognizing that crisis instability in cyberspace arises largely from misperception, (2) promulgating norms that might modulate crisis reactions, (3) knowing when and how to defuse inadvertent crises stemming from incidents, (4) supporting actions with narrative rather than signaling, (5) bolstering defenses to the point at which potential adversaries no longer believe that cyberattacks (penetrating and disrupting or corrupting information systems, as opposed to cyberespionage) can alter the balance of forces, and (6) calibrating the use of offensive cyberoperations with an assessment of their escalation potential." (p.iii)
The book is structured around 5 chapters:
- Chapter 1: Introduction
- Chapter 2: Avoiding crisis by creating norms
- Chapter 3: Narratives, Dialogues and Signals
- Chapter 4: Escalation Management
- Chapter 5: Implications for Strategic Stability
Keywords: cyberspace, state, attack, cyberattack, escalation, systems...
Conference - CyCon2013
Conference CyCon 2013, International Conference on Cyber Conflict, June 4-7, 2013, Tallinn, Estonia, http://ccdcoe.org/cycon/ CyCon 2013 will focus on the technical, strategic and legal implications of using automatic methods to manage cyber conflicts. The conference will be organized along two tracks: a Strategic Track and a Technical Track. Legal aspects will be incorporated in these two tracks
Conference - Cyber Security for Military and the Defense Sector
Conference: "Cyber Security for Military and the Defense Sector", 19-20th June 2013, London, UK, http://www.smi-online.co.uk/defence/uk/cyber-defence
Conference - Digital Cockpit
Conference: "Digital Cockpit", 13-14 May 2013, London, UK, http://www.smi-online.co.uk/defence/uk/digital-cockpits
Conference - ISR
Conference "ISR", 17-18 April 2013, London, UK, http://www.smi-online.co.uk/defence/uk/isr
Conference - Military Space
Conference - "Military Space", 10-11 April 2013, London, UK, http://www.smi-online.co.uk/defence/uk/milspace
Conference - Order and Chaos
Conference - "Order and Chaos: crisis management and the challenges of the extreme and rare events", 20th March 2013, London, UK, http://www.smi-online.co.uk/defence/uk/masterclass/order-and-chaos-crisis-management-and-the-challenges-of-the-extreme-and-rare-event
Conference - Social Media for Operations
Conference - "Social Media for Operations", 27th February 2013, Amsterdam, Netherlands, http://www.smi-online.co.uk/defence/europe/workshop/social-media-for-operations
Conference - Social media within the military and the defence sector
Conference: "Social media within the military and the defence sector", 25-26 february 2013, Amsterdam. http://www.smi-online.co.uk/defence/europe/social-media-within-the-military-and-defence-sector-europe
Monday, January 7, 2013
News - 2012 Conference Proceedings
CCDCOE 2012 Conference on “Military and Paramilitary Activities in Cyberspace”. Proceedings are now available : http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/CyCon_2012_Proceedings.pdf
Content:
Chapter 1: Cyberspace – The Role of States in the Global Structure
Legal Implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace by Wolff Heintschel von HeineggWhen “Not My Problem” Isn’t Enough: Political Neutrality and National Responsibility in Cyber Conflict by Jason Healey
Neutrality in Cyberspace by Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg
Impact of Cyberspace on Human Rights and Democracy by Vittorio Fanchiotti / Jean Paul Pierini
Chapter 2: Cyber Policy & Strategic Options
Russia’s Public Stance on Cyber/Information Warfare by Keir Giles
French Cyberdefense Policy by Patrice Tromparent
A Treaty for Governing Cyber-Weapons: Potential Benefits and Practical Limitations by Louise ArimatsuInternet as a Critical Infrastructure – A Framework for the Measurement of Maturity and Awareness in the Cyber Sphere by Assaf Y. Keren, Keren Elazari
The Significance of Attribution to Cyberspace Coercion: A Political Perspective by Forrest Hare
The Militarisation of Cyberspace: Why Less May Be Better by Myriam Dunn Cavelty
Chapter 3: Cyber Conflict – Theory & Principles
Beyond Domains, Beyond Commons: The Context and Theory of Conflict in Cyberspaceby Jeffrey L. Caton
Applying Traditional Military Principles to Cyber Warfare by Samuel Liles, J. Eric Dietz, Marcus Rogers, Dean LarsonThe Principle of Maneuver in Cyber Operations by Scott D. Applegate
Countering the Offensive Advantage in Cyberspace: An Integrated Defensive Strategy by David T. FahrenkrugAn Analysis For A Just Cyber Warfare by Mariarosaria Taddeo
Chapter 4: Cyber Conflict – Actors Socially Engineered Commoners as Cyber Warriors - Estonian Future or Present? by Birgy Lorenz, Kaido KikkasThe Notion of Combatancy in Cyber Warfare by Sean Watts
Direct Participation in Cyber Hostilities: Terms of Reference for Like-Minded States? by Jody Prescott
Chapter 5: “Cyber-Attacks” – Trends, Methods & Legal Classification
Attack Trends in Present Computer Networks by Robert Koch, Björn Stelte, Mario Golling
“Attack” as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context by Michael N. Schmitt
Ius ad bellum in Cyberspace – Some Thoughts on the “Schmitt-Criteria” for Use of Force by Katharina ZiolkowskiThe “Use of Force” in Cyberspace: A Reply to Dr Ziolkowski by Michael N. Schmitt
A Methodology for Cyber Operations Targeting and Control of Collateral Damage in the Context of Lawful Armed Conflict by Robert Fanelli, Gregory Conti
Command and Control of Cyber Weapons by Enn Tyugu
A Case Study on the Miner Botnet by Daniel Plohmann, Elmar Gerhards-Padilla
Chapter 6: Cyber Defence – Methods & Tools
Natural Privacy Preservation Protocol for Electronic Mail by Kim Hartmann, Christoph Steup
Paradigm Change of Vehicle Cyber-Security by Hiro Onishi
Sensing for Suspicion at Scale: A Bayesian Approach for Cyber Conflict Attribution and Reasoning by Harsha K. Kalutarage, Siraj A. Shaikh, Qin Zhou, Anne E. James
The Role of COTS Products for High Security Systems by Robert Koch, Gabi Dreo Rodosek
Conceptual Framework for Cyber Defense Information Sharing within Trust Relationships by
Diego Fernández Vázquez, Oscar Pastor Acosta, Christopher Spirito, Sarah Brown, Emily Reid
Legal Implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace by Wolff Heintschel von HeineggWhen “Not My Problem” Isn’t Enough: Political Neutrality and National Responsibility in Cyber Conflict by Jason Healey
Neutrality in Cyberspace by Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg
Impact of Cyberspace on Human Rights and Democracy by Vittorio Fanchiotti / Jean Paul Pierini
Chapter 2: Cyber Policy & Strategic Options
Russia’s Public Stance on Cyber/Information Warfare by Keir Giles
French Cyberdefense Policy by Patrice Tromparent
A Treaty for Governing Cyber-Weapons: Potential Benefits and Practical Limitations by Louise ArimatsuInternet as a Critical Infrastructure – A Framework for the Measurement of Maturity and Awareness in the Cyber Sphere by Assaf Y. Keren, Keren Elazari
The Significance of Attribution to Cyberspace Coercion: A Political Perspective by Forrest Hare
The Militarisation of Cyberspace: Why Less May Be Better by Myriam Dunn Cavelty
Chapter 3: Cyber Conflict – Theory & Principles
Beyond Domains, Beyond Commons: The Context and Theory of Conflict in Cyberspaceby Jeffrey L. Caton
Applying Traditional Military Principles to Cyber Warfare by Samuel Liles, J. Eric Dietz, Marcus Rogers, Dean LarsonThe Principle of Maneuver in Cyber Operations by Scott D. Applegate
Countering the Offensive Advantage in Cyberspace: An Integrated Defensive Strategy by David T. FahrenkrugAn Analysis For A Just Cyber Warfare by Mariarosaria Taddeo
Chapter 4: Cyber Conflict – Actors Socially Engineered Commoners as Cyber Warriors - Estonian Future or Present? by Birgy Lorenz, Kaido KikkasThe Notion of Combatancy in Cyber Warfare by Sean Watts
Direct Participation in Cyber Hostilities: Terms of Reference for Like-Minded States? by Jody Prescott
Chapter 5: “Cyber-Attacks” – Trends, Methods & Legal Classification
Attack Trends in Present Computer Networks by Robert Koch, Björn Stelte, Mario Golling
“Attack” as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context by Michael N. Schmitt
Ius ad bellum in Cyberspace – Some Thoughts on the “Schmitt-Criteria” for Use of Force by Katharina ZiolkowskiThe “Use of Force” in Cyberspace: A Reply to Dr Ziolkowski by Michael N. Schmitt
A Methodology for Cyber Operations Targeting and Control of Collateral Damage in the Context of Lawful Armed Conflict by Robert Fanelli, Gregory Conti
Command and Control of Cyber Weapons by Enn Tyugu
A Case Study on the Miner Botnet by Daniel Plohmann, Elmar Gerhards-Padilla
Chapter 6: Cyber Defence – Methods & Tools
Natural Privacy Preservation Protocol for Electronic Mail by Kim Hartmann, Christoph Steup
Paradigm Change of Vehicle Cyber-Security by Hiro Onishi
Sensing for Suspicion at Scale: A Bayesian Approach for Cyber Conflict Attribution and Reasoning by Harsha K. Kalutarage, Siraj A. Shaikh, Qin Zhou, Anne E. James
The Role of COTS Products for High Security Systems by Robert Koch, Gabi Dreo Rodosek
Conceptual Framework for Cyber Defense Information Sharing within Trust Relationships by
Diego Fernández Vázquez, Oscar Pastor Acosta, Christopher Spirito, Sarah Brown, Emily Reid
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